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The terms implicit and automatic processes are used interchangeably in this dissertation 
and refer to underlying thought processes that are nonvolitional and occur without 
awareness or attention.  Differences in automatic cognitive processes between depressed 
individuals and nondepressed individuals are discussed in relation to implicit attentional 
biases, implicit memory, and implicit judgments and associations.  The following 
hypotheses are proposed in this study: (1) There will be differences in task responses on 
implicit measures between depressed and never depressed individuals, in that depressed 
individuals will show stronger association between self and negative content words and 
will exhibit greater implicit memory for negative words compared to never depressed 
individuals; (2) Grouping depressed individuals based on a depressive personality style 
will provide greater sensitivity for implicit measures of depression, in that depressed 
individuals will show greater implicit processing of negative content words that pertain to 
the individual’s depressive style; and (3) Implicit measures of depression will correlate to 
a greater degree with each other than with explicit measures.  The implicit association 
test (IAT) and word stem completion task were used to assess implicit cognitive 
processes, and mixed-model MANOVA’s and correlation analyses were used to test the 
hypotheses.  The results of mixed model MANOVA’s showed significant differences in 
self-concept associative bias within depressed and never depressed groups, in that both 
groups demonstrated a positive bias in self-concept.  There were was a strong tendency 
for differences between groups based on autonomy on the IAT.  Those high on autonomy 
exhibited a tendency for lower self-concept positive bias than those depressed and low on 
autonomy and those never depressed.  These results indicated that those who were 
depressed and scored high on autonomy viewed themselves in a less positive light than 
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the other groups when they implicitly made associations between themselves and 
negative autonomous stimuli and positive stimuli.  Results indicate significant 
correlations between implicit and explicit measures and between implicit measures and 
between explicit measures.
 
                
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
1.  Introduction 
 Depression is a widespread and serious mental health problem.  The lifetime risk 
for major depressive disorder varies from 10% to 25% for women and from 5% to 12% 
for men, and the point prevalence has varied from 5% to 9% for women and from 2% to 
3% for men (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  Johnson, Hayes, Field, 
Schneiderman, and McCabe (2000) report that up to 76% of individuals diagnosed with 
depression will experience a recurrent episode within 10 years (Piccinell & Wilkinson, 
1994), with up to 15% of individuals with recurrent depression committing suicide (Clark 
& Fawcett, 1992).  In addition, they report the World Health Organization ranked 
depression as the fourth leading source of disease encumbrance in 1990 (Murray & 
Lopez, 1996), and the costs to the domestic economy exceed $30 billion annually (Rice 
& Miller, 1995).    
Common symptoms of depression include prominent and persistent depressed 
mood, anhedonia, poor or increased appetite, insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor 
retardation or agitation, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness or guilt, inability to 
concentrate, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, and thoughts of death or suicide 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  In addition, there may be dysfunction in 
cognitive processes including memory impairment and negative biases in perception and 
interpretation. 
Theories of Depression 
In the last few decades, depression has been explained by cognitive theorists with 
reference to vulnerability factors leading to negative biases and dysfunction in 
information processing.  According to Aaron Beck (1963, 1967, 1976), emotional 
 
                
vulnerability for depression may begin in childhood with experiences of loss, failure, or 
abandonment.  To accommodate these experiences, some individuals may develop 
schemata in long-term memory that are used to perceive, attend to, and interpret stimuli 
in the environment that may in part resemble those of earlier experiences.  Consequently, 
this type of information processing may result in distortion of both negative and benign 
experiences into those of a negative emotional nature such as loss, failure, or 
abandonment.  Schemata act as filters, in that individuals selectively attend to and 
remember stimuli that are consistent with their schemas and do not attend to and 
remember information contrary to their schemas.  These negative distortions and 
subsequent interpretations may lead to dysphoric mood especially during stressful times, 
which further strengthens negative schemas.  In addition, Beck acknowledges that not 
only do schemata and cognitive distortions play a role in the onset and/or maintenance of 
depression but genetic vulnerability may contribute as well.   
Another cognitive model of depression proposed by Seligman (1975) is based on 
the concept of learned helplessness.  Individuals who are vulnerable to depression may 
develop the belief that they have no or little control over their lives; that is, their 
responses to life’s events will not change subsequent outcomes.   Abramson, Seligman, 
and Teasdale (1978) revised this theory by postulating that depressed individuals may 
formulate certain attributions for causes of events such as internal (“I am culpable”), 
global (“This happens to me in every area of my life”), and stable (“This will happen 
again to me”) attributions for negative life events or failures and external (“It’s not my 
doing”), specific (“It only occurred in this one area of my life”), and unstable (“It 
happened just this one time and won’t occur again”) attributions for positive life events or 
 
                
successes.  Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) integrated learned hopelessness into 
their model to describe the interaction of life stresses with prior cognitive biases that 
exacerbate depressive attributions about current situations and future events.   
Other theorists have explained depression from a network model perspective of 
emotion.   Anderson and Bower (1973) explain long-term memory via a semantic 
network.  Nodes exist within an interconnected network whereby activation of a node 
leads to activation of those nodes that represent constructs related to it.  Bower (1981, 
1987) proposed that there exists in humans a network of interconnected emotion nodes 
that represent distinct emotional states, and when emotion nodes are activated 
simultaneously, their associations strengthen over time and subsequently can activate one 
another more efficiently than weakly associated emotion nodes.  Mood-congruent 
information may be easier to retrieve than mood-incongruent information because it does 
not involve accessing new affect-emotion nodes (Ingram, 1984).  The associations 
between emotionally congruent nodes may be stronger in depressed individuals than in 
nondepressed individuals (Bower 1981, 1987).  These associations may be related to 
Beck’s (1967) concept of schemata in that a minor failure may automatically prime 
depression in vulnerable individuals, leading to dysphoric mood.  Teasdale (1988) 
proposed a cyclical relationship between depression vulnerability and mood state, in that 
when vulnerable individuals experience low mood, they have increased selective 
attention to and memory of negative events that in turn increase and prolong dysphoria.  
These theories differ in the degree to which schemata resemble stable traits and 
information-processing tendencies versus a latent vulnerability that requires activation to 
bias information processing (Segal, 1988). 
 
                
Segal (1988) discusses how self-schemata have been explained via theories of 
availability/accessibility and network theory of associative memory, and he suggests that 
reconceptualizing self-schema in cognitive-structural terms will enable testing of self-
schema hypotheses.  According to accessibility theory, as frequency of the activation of a 
construct is increased, there is a higher probability of its use in the future (Higgins, King, 
& Mavin, 1982).  Negative self-schema accessibility plays a role in depression, in that 
depressed individuals are more likely than nondepressed individuals to have negative 
constructs rather than positive constructs accessible in memory based on what is available 
(existing) in memory (Higgins & King, 1981; Segal).  Segal states that there appears to 
be a mood congruity relationship between affect and accessibility, in that information that 
matches the individual's mood state is more accessible and thus more easily recalled.  
Segal concludes that these theories of accessibility and mood congruity associative 
memory describe correlation of mood and cognitive constructs.  However, he argues that 
these correlations do not fully explain whether these constructs develop from an 
organized self-schema.  Segal argues that although the cognitive-structural view he 
advocates is similar to the above theories, it differs in that it posits a highly interrelated 
organization of self-constructs in defining the cognitive structure of self.  He states that 
activating a construct in the system should increase the accessibility of connected 
constructs that are also self-referent.  In conducting research on cognitive processing and 
the role of self-schema, Segal stresses that one must look not only at content of 
information but the relation among constructs in memory as well.  He advises that due to 
the strong interrelations among self-constructs, the self-schema may be activated in the 
absence of depressed mood.  This means that negative self-schema may exist in an 
 
                
individual even when that individual is not currently in a depressive episode.   Segal 
criticizes studies that use direct accessibility measures of assessment to explain cognitive 
structure, since he argues they cannot detect this level of representation.  As an 
alternative, structure may be studied by indirect assessment measures, such as in 
automaticity research, where implicit measures of assessment are used. 
Criticism of Self-Report Measures 
Various self-report measures have been used to assess depression, such as the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; 
BDI-II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D: Radloff, 1977), Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Depression 
Scale (MMPI-D-30: Demsey, 1964),  Multiple Affect Adjective Check List-Revised 
(MAACL-R: Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985), and Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS: 
Zung, 1965).  Self-report measures are typically used in research to assess for depression 
and although not intended for use as clinical diagnostic tools, they are often used as 
screening devices (Boyle, 1985).  Many criticisms of self-report measures have been 
cited, such as their vulnerability to social desirability, self-deception, subjectivity, 
experimental demand, and insensitivity in measuring cognitive processes.  Individuals 
may be susceptible to experimental demand, especially if a measure is re-administered in 
the same study (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001).  Individuals may present 
themselves in a more favorable light by underreporting depressive symptoms to avoid 
evaluation by others, either initially or during post-treatment assessment of symptoms 
(Eysenck, 1991; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999).  Researchers have 
found that several self-report depression and anxiety measures are moderately to highly 
 
                
associated with social desirability (Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986).  For example, 
Tanaka-Matsumi and Kameoka found correlations ranging from -.49 to -.85 and -.19 to -
.32 between nine anxiety and depression scales and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale 
(ESDS: Edwards, 1957) and Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS: 
Crown & Marlowe, 1960), respectively.   
According to Shedler, Mayman, and Manis, individuals may also deceive 
themselves about their psychiatric symptoms, in that they may have an illusion of mental 
health (1993).  They refer to these individuals as defensive deniers.   They explain that 
these individuals use denial of psychological distress as a defense mechanism and may 
ignore their feelings, desires, and needs.  Self-report measures may accurately measure 
distress in those who are manifestly distressed and in those who are genuinely healthy but 
may not capture underlying distress in those who have illusory mental health (Shedler et 
al.).  On the contrary, Taylor and Brown (1988) assert that mentally healthy people tend 
to have illusions of exaggerated positive self-evaluations, perceptions of control, and 
optimism.  They tend to have positive cognitive biases during encoding, interpretation, 
and retrieval.  They suggest that those individuals who have low self-esteem and/or are 
depressed somehow lack these positive cognitive biases and consequently view their 
worlds in a more realistic fashion.  Taylor and Brown suggest that these illusions may be 
helpful in overcoming setbacks, maintaining high self-esteem, and maintaining a positive 
view of the future.  On the other hand, Shedler and colleagues argue that defensive 
deniers who have an illusion of mental health may not fall into the category of mentally 
healthy.  In their study, they used the Eysenck Neuroticism scale for the self-report 
measure, and clinical judges rated participants as relatively healthy or relatively 
 
                
distressed based on the Early Memory Test (Mayman & Faris, 1960).  Participants who 
scored below the mean on the self-report measure but were judged by clinicians to be 
distressed were classified as having illusory mental health.  Dependent measures 
consisted of physiological measures and a verbal defensiveness measure based on 
responses to phrase associations.  Shedler and colleagues found that those having illusory 
mental health showed higher levels of physiological reactivity under stress and more 
verbal manifestations of defense than genuinely healthy and manifestly distressed 
participants.  Thus, having an illusion of mental health may not be indicative of genuine 
mental health but rather may have an effect on physiological arousal and an association 
with defensiveness.   
Gotlib and Krasnoperova (1998) argue that self-report measures are not suitable 
to assess the existence and operation of schemata or associate networks. Based on 
theorized definitions of schemata and associate networks, these operations are automatic 
and nonvolitional.  In general, individuals may not accurately report their underlying 
cognitive processes since they may not be aware of them or may not be accurate in their 
perception of these processes involved in their judgments, behavior, choices, etc. 
(Higgins & King, 1981; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).   Nisbett and Wilson explain that 
individuals may be unaware of a stimulus, a response, or that a stimulus influenced a 
response.  Instead individuals may respond with a causal explanation or judgment based 
on “a priori implicit causal theories”.  For example, they describe their study in which 
individuals who were out shopping participated in a “consumer survey” where they were 
asked to indicate which one of four pair of stockings was of the highest quality (in reality 
all were of the same quality).  Shoppers chose the right-most pair of stockings as the 
 
                
highest quality almost four to one over the left-most pair, and when asked for the reason 
for their choice, no one mentioned the position of the pair of stockings, and when asked 
about this as a possible decision factor, all individuals denied it.  They suggested that 
shoppers started evaluating on the left and may have wanted to avoid impulsively 
choosing the first one they saw.  Whatever the actual reason, people implicitly made a 
decision, that is, they were unaware of the real reason why they made the judgment.   In 
the area of depression, there is the parallel of automatic judgments and explanations of 
one’s own and others’ behavior that may be inaccurate.  Depressed individuals may 
automatically make negatively biased causal attributions about their own behavior and 
others’ behavior toward them.  As a result, depressed individuals may react in a negative 
fashion; for example, they may avoid contact with another in the future, or they may 
experience a worsening of depressed mood, and not be aware of the causes for such 
behavior.  They may provide inaccurate socially learned information about their 
symptoms or reasons for their symptoms without intention, similar to the basis for 
judgment investigators provided for participants in the stocking study described above.  
Therefore, more direct self-report measures of cognitive processes may not accurately 
assess the underlying cognitive processes of the depressive syndrome.  Perhaps implicit 
measures may come closer to assessing these processes.   
Implicit Cognitive Processes 
In seeking to explain depression via a network model perspective, it is crucial to 
delineate between effortful (explicit or conscious) processes and automatic (implicit or 
nonconscious) processes.  In this paper the terms implicit cognitive processes and 
automaticity are used interchangeably.  Theories defining these processes are based on 
 
                
the assumption that humans possess a limited capacity to process information (Ingram, 
1984).  Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, and Dykman (1993) suggest most theorists agree 
automatic processes occur without:  awareness or attention, intention, control, and using 
energy from a limited cognitive system (thus avoiding interference with effortful 
processes).  In addition, they concluded that automaticity may be a product of multiple 
experiences with processing specific stimuli in a particular way, but other automatic 
processes do not benefit from practice per se (see Eysenck, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  For example, Hasher and Zacks proposed that automatic 
processes that are genetically predisposed such as processing of spatial and temporal 
information do not further develop with time; however, other automatic processes 
improve with practice, such as behaviors that make up a complex skill.  Andersen and 
Limpert (2001) argue that although these are all components of implicit processes, they 
need not co-occur.  Hartlage and colleagues summarize that explicit processes, on the 
contrary, require attention and cognitive resources, are serial (controlling only one 
sequence at a time), and may improve with practice.  Bargh (1984) describes another 
differentiation between the two processes in that implicit processes tend to be difficult to 
inhibit while explicit processes are relatively easy to disrupt and modify.     
It has been suggested that automatic and explicit processes occur along a 
continuum (Schneider & Schiffrin, 1977) that has been described as a blend of automatic 
and effortful processes (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1984).   What researchers define as 
“automatic” may not meet all criteria of automaticity as listed above, but rather falls close 
to the automatic end of the continuum.  Hartlage and colleagues suggest that the 
continuum consists of the following processes: hereditary and automatic (encoding of 
 
                
frequency and spatial location), learned and automatic (activation of word meaning while 
reading), veiled and effortful (making conscious judgments without remembering the 
source of data on which one bases a decision), and accessible and effortful (taking an 
exam).  Greenwald (1997) explains self-deception by describing explicit and implicit 
processes from a neural network modeling perspective whereby the two processes may 
occur simultaneously and independently of each other, as if they were occurring in the 
right and left hemispheres of a split-brain patient.  As a consequence, these processes 
may not be congruent, that is, what people report may not be congruent with their 
implicit response.  An example of this incongruity is the outcome of the “evaluating 
stockings” study (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) described earlier.  Another example of 
possible incongruity between implicit and explicit processes is described by Bargh in a 
study of behavioral consequences of trait concept activation (1997).  Participants were 
primed with words relating to rudeness, politeness, or neither rudeness nor politeness 
during a “language test”.  It was assumed that the priming would trigger the construct of 
rudeness or politeness in participants, and they would behave in a manner consistent with 
this activation.  Participants were then instructed to find the experimenter when they had 
completed the “language test” to continue with the second experiment.  The experimenter 
was speaking with another “participant” (a confederate) when the participant approached.  
The number of minutes (up to 10 minutes) that it took the participant to interrupt was 
timed.  The investigators found that significantly more of the participants who were 
primed by the rude content words interrupted the experimenter than those who were 
primed with polite content words.  Participants reported they had no awareness of the 
 
                
effect of the priming task on their behavior, although they agreed unanimously that the 
experimenter behaved rudely.       
There have been numerous methods used to differentiate explicit from implicit 
processes.  Techniques have been created and revised for various dimensions of study, 
such as variants of the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935), probe detection tasks 
(MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998), dual task procedures (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), free 
recall memory measures (clustering) (Bargh & Chartrand), sequential priming techniques 
(Bargh & Chartrand), pronunciation tasks (Bargh & Chartrand), tasks using homophones 
(Eysenck, 1991), implicit association tests (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), 
word stem completion tasks (Kirsner et al., 1998), backward masking (Turvey, 1973), 
frequency processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), perceptual identification (Kirsner et al.) 
and lexical decision tasks (Kirsner et al.).   
Various methods have been used to assess automatic or implicit cognitive 
processes in depression research.  Gotlib and Neubauer (2000) describe the following 
tasks that have been adopted and modified for attentional biases studies:  emotion Stroop 
task, dichotic listening task, dot-probe task, and deployment of attention task.  In the 
modified Stroop task and many other tasks, the dependent variable is response time to 
measure processing efficiency and interference; however Bargh and Tota (1988) warn 
that raw response latency alone is not a true measure of automaticity, but rather a 
concurrent memory-load task is required to rule out potential controlled processing 
biases.  More recent studies have employed a cognitive load condition as a secondary 
task to the primary one, so that attentional capacity is limited and automaticity may be 
 
                
established (Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; MacDonald & Kuiper, 1985; Strayer & 
Kramer, 1990).     
Other investigators have used judgment memory tasks in which participants are 
instructed to state which type of judgment they were asked to make regarding a pair of 
words in a prior task (e.g, which word meaning is heavier, larger, more emotional, etc.), 
and frequency monitoring, in which participants were asked to indicate whether words on 
a list were read once or twice (Roy-Byrne, Weingartner, Bierer, Thompson, & Post 
1986).   Recently researchers have employed a homophone task (words that sound the 
same but have different spellings and meanings) to study perception of ambiguous stimuli 
(Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989).  In addition, the 
following inferential methods have been used to study schematic processing: the 
identification of features of social categories, category judgments, incidental recall tasks, 
organization in free recall, autobiographical memory, and multidimensional scaling 
(Hollon and Shelton, 1991).  The degree to which the above instruments measure 
automaticity may vary along a continuum. 
Horowitz, Nelson, and Person (1997) proposed a test battery of behavioral 
assessment measures that vary in degree of automaticity to circumvent the pitfalls of self-
report measures.  Their proposed battery consists of: describe yourself, negative 
clustering task, subjective conditional probability task, sad music redintegration task, 
blurring of mild-to-severe experiences of sadness task, ‘like me’ reaction time task, 
tachistoscopic recognition task, free-recall task, recognition memory task, measure of 
beta in the recognition task, frequency estimate of positive reinforcements task, ease of 
recalling negative events task, and the Stroop effect task.  This proposed battery is 
 
                
comprised of an aggregate of the above measures, based on the assumption that the 
measures are on average correlated.  This assumption may need to be investigated.  For 
example, one study of implicit self-esteem examined the reliability and validity of seven 
implicit self-esteem measures and found that in general the measures did not correlate 
with one another (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000).  
 The Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald et al., 1998) was developed to 
measure individual differences in implicit cognition and has been used to measure self-
concept and self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), prejudices (Greenwald et al.; 
Rudman et al., 1999), and associations in recovered depressed patients (Gemar et al., 
2001) and individuals with specific phobias (Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001).   The 
IAT was designed to assess implicit attitudes, that is, attitudes that are automatically 
activated in an individual without his or her awareness or control (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995).  The IAT has been used to assess this automatic activation by measuring the 
difference between response times in associating different concepts and attributes 
(Greenwald et al.).  The underlying assumption, based on neural network theory, is that 
strongly associated attribute-concept pairs should be easier to classify together than are 
weakly associated or incompatible attribute-concept pairs (Farnham, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 1999).  This is measured by response time differences or errors in making these 
associations.  For example, when strongly associated categories (flower and pleasant) 
share a response key, response time is faster than when weakly associated categories 
(insect and pleasant) share a response key (Greenwald et al.).    
Several researchers have used a word stem completion task to assess implicit 
cognitive processes (Banos, Medina, & Pascual, 2001; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Lang & 
 
                
Craske, 1997).  Individuals are given the first few letters of a target word and are asked to 
complete the word as quickly as possible with the first word that comes to mind (Bradley, 
Mogg, & Williams, 1994).   Implicit memory may be assessed with a word stem 
completion task in conjunction with priming, in that prior exposure to words may 
facilitate performance on a task without the individual’s realization of the association 
(Graf & Schacter, 1985).   Implicit memory is indicated when individuals complete more 
word stems with primed words than unprimed words (Banos et al.).  Some researchers 
studying implicit mood-congruent memory (enhanced recall of information that is 
congruent with mood) have found no differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals on the word stem completion task (Danion, Kauffmann-Muller, Grange, 
Zimmerman, & Greth, 1995; Denny & Hunt; Watkins, Martin, & Stern, 2000, Watkins, 
Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992).  Some theorists claim that this finding is due to 
the perceptual nature of the word stem completion task versus the conceptual nature of 
the cognitive processes being studied (Roediger, 1990; Roediger & McDermott, 1992).  
This is based on transfer-appropriate processing theory, in that memory will be enhanced 
if the cognitive processes involved in the task are congruent rather than incongruent with 
the cognitive processes being measured (TAP; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977).  In 
the above studies, conceptual cognitive processes were being studied (meaning of words) 
with a perceptually driven cognitive task (word stem completion) (Watkins et al., 2000).  
Roediger explains that in the word stem completion task, incomplete perceptual 
information is presented, reflecting data-driven or perceptual processing, where “the 
perceptual features of the word must be ‘driven through’ the perceptual system” (p. 
1049).  The word stem completion task is directed by the perceptual features of the 
 
                
stimuli, not the meaning of the stimuli (Watkins, Vache, Verney, Muller, & Mathews, 
1996).  They give an example that the meaning of los_ is not pertinent in completing the 
word stem with the first word that comes to the individual.  Eysenck (1991) further 
explains that data-driven processes are guided by external stimuli vis-à-vis conceptually 
driven processes that rely on expectations and knowledge.  Eysenck states that 
researchers may reduce the use of data-driven processes in tasks by presenting stimuli 
briefly or by presenting ambiguous stimuli, and they may increase the use of conceptually 
driven processes by presenting stimuli that are relevant to individuals’ concerns.  It may 
be that the word stem completion task has features of a conceptually driven task in that 
the word is not simply read, but the individual must access a word from memory that 
would complete the stem.  In addition, primed word stems can be completed with self-
relevant words (e.g. depressive content words).  Roediger states that it is possible to use 
implicit memory tests that are conceptually driven, and several researchers have done this 
(e.g. Watkins et al., 1996).        
Automatic Cognitive Processes in Depression 
Hartlage and colleagues (1993) report that depression seems to interfere with 
effortful processing.  In reviewing numerous studies, they found support for interference 
in the following effortful domains in individuals suffering from depression:  intellectual 
functioning tasks, problem solving, general learning, certain encoding tasks, reading 
comprehension, and motor speed.  Impairment in some of the above tasks may depend in 
part on the severity of depression.  They review and provide evidence for the following 
causal mechanisms for interference with effortful processes: reduction of cognitive 
 
                
capacity, narrowing of attention, and a combination of the two, capacity reduction, and 
negative focus.   
The use of automatic processes may be helpful to maximize efficiency in 
information processing and allow for concurrent effortful tasks to be executed; however, 
there are situations where automatic processes may be dysfunctional (Moretti & Shaw, 
1989).  According to Moretti and Shaw, although individuals may easily interrupt 
automatic processes during simple cognitive tasks to correct errors, in other more 
complex tasks, this control may not be so readily apparent.  In addition, they suggest 
there may be individual differences that lead to increased vulnerability to dysfunctional 
automatic information processing.  They propose that dysfunctional automaticity will be 
amplified when individuals experience the following: ambiguous criteria for detecting 
dysfunction in processing, a lack of performance feedback, performance of complex 
stimulus-response sequences, heightened affective arousal and limited attentional 
resources, and contextual or individual factors that increase the accessibility of specific 
constructs that interfere with interpretation of facts.  Specifically, they conclude that in 
depression, dysfunctional patterns of attention, interpretation, and memory occur 
automatically, and these errors in information processing exacerbate or maintain 
dysphoric mood (Hollon and Shelton, 1991).  Other researchers argue that depression is 
better explained by explicit cognitive processes.  For example, some hypothesize that 
biases favoring negative information occur after reaching consciousness (Mogg, Bradley, 
Williams, & Mathews, 1993).  They claim that elaboration, which is a controlled stage of 
processing, is required in processing negative stimuli.    
 
                
Some theorists warn that some seemingly automatic processes may require 
conscious mediation for meaning (Isen & Diamond, 1989).  Isen and Diamond state that 
an automatic cognitive process may be followed by a shift in attention to the newly 
noticed stimulus.  Once this shift in awareness has occurred, the process changes from 
automatic to volitional.  They explain that negative affect may be processed 
automatically as a result of the quality of the stimuli but also in the context of situational 
demands, the individuals’ goals and strategies, and a priori decisions to allow that kind of 
processing to occur.  The differentiation between cognitive products and processes has 
been explained by several theorists (Ingram & Kendall, 1986; Hollon & Garber, 1988).  
Cognitive products are defined as outputs of information processing (for example, what 
people say, think, and do), while cognitive processes transform knowledge structures into 
cognitive products (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  Through cognitive processes, information is 
perceived, encoded, altered, combined, and stored (Hollon and Garber).  Individuals may 
be aware of cognitive products, yet the existence and content of knowledge structures can 
only be surmised (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
Although depression may interfere with effortful processing, depression may not 
interfere with automatic processing (Hartlage et al., 1993). For example, depressed 
individuals perform as well as nondepressed individuals in frequency encoding and 
spatial location encoding (Hartlage et al.).  There are numerous studies suggesting that 
depressed individuals automatically process information in a qualitatively different 
manner than nondepressed individuals.  Hartlage and colleagues review studies showing 
that depressed individuals but not nondepressed individuals show automatic processing of 
 
                
negative content stimuli over neutral stimuli.  Specific studies demonstrating qualitative 
differences will be discussed later. 
Implicit Memory 
Automaticity is frequently addressed in the study of attention and memory.  Graf 
and Schacter (1985) theorize that explicit memory may be identified when task 
performance requires conscious recollection of prior experiences, and implicit memory is 
exposed when task performance is facilitated in the absence of conscious recollection.  
Implicit memory is remembering without intention.  A common occurrence of implicit 
memory may be the performance of already learned skills, for example driving a car or 
typing on a keyboard.  Individuals don’t consciously recall how to perform these skills, 
and if they attempt to do so, their performance may decline (Roediger, 1990).  Implicit 
memory is usually studied by researchers via a priming task followed by the memory 
task.  In general, priming refers to how recent experience creates temporary internal 
readiness for response tendencies without intention (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  For 
example, priming may involve the presentation of visual stimuli that facilitates 
performance on a subsequent task.  Hines (1992) describes that when individuals respond 
to presentation of visual stimuli, they will respond faster if they have viewed that visual 
stimuli earlier in the experiment.  This speeding up effect is called the priming effect.  
Eysenck (1991) provides examples of explicit memory - free recall, cued recall, and 
recognition (with instruction to retrieve information that was stored in the past) and 
implicit memory - word completion tasks.  He suggests that the differentiation between 
the two types of memory is exemplified in amnesia research, since although patients with 
amnesia traditionally endorse major impairment in long-term memory, they do not 
 
                
demonstrate impairment in implicit memory (see Schacter, 1987).  For example, 
Roediger describes a study by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) where amnesic patients 
and controls completed two explicit memory tasks (free recall and recognition) and two 
implicit tasks (word-fragment identification and word stem completion).  Non-amnesic 
participants significantly outperformed the amnesic group on the explicit task; however, 
there was no significant difference on the implicit tasks between groups.   
Many studies have investigated explicit memory in depressed individuals, while 
fewer have addressed implicit memory processes.  For example, Derry and Kuiper (1981) 
instructed participants to respond “yes” or “no” to one of three questions about target 
words.  The wording of the questions elicited either a semantic, self-referential, or 
structural type of processing.  Afterward, participants were told to recall the trait words 
from the task just performed.  Depressed individuals demonstrated better recall of 
depressed-content words from a self-referential task (versus structural and semantic 
tasks), while nondepressed individuals exhibited better recall of self-referential 
nondepressed-content words.   The results of this study and others (see Murray, 
Whitehouse, & Alloy, 1999; Denny & Hunt, 1992) lend support to the hypothesis that 
depressed individuals but not nondepressed individuals have negative self-schemas that 
taint perception and recall of life events; however, automatic biases in the strictest sense 
could not be established in this type of task, since elaboration of thoughts about the 
stimuli and explicit memory may have occurred (see also Hertel & Hardin, 1990; 
Watkins et al., 1992).  On the other hand, this task was not purely explicit in that 
participants were not instructed to remember stimuli that described them prior to nor 
during the experimental tasks.  Jacoby and colleagues (1993) propose the process-
 
                
dissociation procedure as an experimental method to separate implicit from explicit 
processes in memory.  This procedure is described later in the methods section.   
According to Gotlib and Neubauer (2000), recent studies have focused on 
conceptual (meaning of the stimuli) rather than perceptual (matching word stems) 
processing in implicit memory research, whereby participants use conceptual processing 
at encoding and retrieval.  As stated earlier, researchers predicted that according to 
transfer-appropriate processing theory (Morris et al., 1977), conceptual study of words 
followed by a conceptual memory test and perceptual study of words followed by a 
perceptual memory test will result in stronger implicit memory than if conceptual and 
perceptual encoding and memory test are mixed (Roediger, 1990).  These studies using 
conceptual implicit memory tasks have found support for negative biases in implicit 
memory in depressed individuals (Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 1994; Watkins et al., 
1996).   For example, Watkins and colleagues (2000) used a study design with four 
implicit memory tests, two conceptual (free association and word retrieval) and two 
perceptual (word stem completion task and word identification) to study implicit memory 
in depressed and nondepressed individuals.  They describe the tests they used as follows: 
(1) Free association is the presentation of association cues with the instruction to produce 
three one-word associations related to the cue as quickly as possible; (2) Word retrieval is 
the presentation of a definition with the request to produce a word that fits with the 
definition; (3) Word stem completion task is the completion of a three- or four-letter 
word stem with the first word that comes to mind; (4) Word identification is the brief 
presentation of words (33 ms) on a computer monitor followed by masking, and 
individuals attempt to identify the stimulus word.  Depressed and nondepressed 
 
                
individuals studied negative and positive adjectives via two types of encoding, conceptual 
(semantic encoding, self-referential) and perceptual (structural encoding).  They did not 
find significant mood congruent memory with perceptually encoded targets.  Although all 
the tests showed reliable priming for conceptually encoded words, they only found mood 
congruent memory with conceptually encoded words followed by the word retrieval 
analysis (conceptual memory test).  In summary, there was a priming effect on memory 
for conceptual encoding followed by the four memory tests, and one of the two 
conceptual tests following the conceptual encoding showed significant mood congruent 
memory (as predicted by TAP theory of matching conceptual encoding with a conceptual 
task).  However, although priming was significant when perceptual encoding was 
followed by perceptual tests, perceptual encoding did not show significant priming on 
conceptual tests.  In addition, mood congruent memory was not evident in the two 
perceptual encoding groups.  Watkins and colleagues found evidence of mood congruent 
implicit memory when conceptual encoding was followed by a conceptual implicit 
memory test, in that depressed individuals showed greater memory for depressed content 
stimuli, and nondepressed individuals showed greater memory for nondepressed content 
stimuli.  However, contrary to TAP theory, perceptual encoding followed by perceptual 
implicit memory tests did not show mood congruent implicit memory.  
One study investigated mood-congruent biases in implicit memory in depressed 
individuals using a primed lexical decision task (Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 1995).  The 
investigators used supraliminal and subliminal priming conditions.  Supraliminal priming 
is a condition where individuals are presented with stimuli very briefly, yet they are 
aware of the stimuli.  In this study stimuli were presented for 7 seconds (other studies use 
 
                
much briefer presentation, for example, less than one second).  Subliminal priming is 
where individuals are presented with stimuli below their conscious awareness threshold.  
In this study stimuli were presented for 14 ms followed by a string of letters to avoid 
prolonged stimuli exposure either on the computer screen or as a mental image.  
Participants were primed with depression-relevant, anxiety-relevant, categorized neutral, 
uncategorized neutral, and positive words.  In the subliminal priming condition, 
participants were shown the target word immediately after the prime, while in the 
supraliminal condition, the target word was presented approximately 5 minutes later 
(prime word = target word).  The depressed group demonstrated greater priming of 
depression-relevant words compared to the anxious and control groups, and the group 
differences were not significantly influenced by the priming condition (subliminal versus 
supraliminal).  The investigators report that their findings indicate clinically depressed 
individuals demonstrate an automatic memory bias for depression-relevant information. 
Automaticity in Depression Versus Anxiety 
Self-report measures of depression and anxiety tend to exhibit overlap and 
consequently high correlation due to common symptoms, social desirability, and presence 
of secondary depression in individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders (Gotlib & Cane, 
1989).  Theorists have further conceptualized implicit versus explicit measures of these 
two syndromes, in an attempt to differentiate the two types of disorders.  According to 
Beck’s (1976; Beck & Emery, 1986) and Bower’s (1981) theories of emotion, both 
depressed individuals and anxious individuals, or individuals vulnerable to these 
disorders, will endorse cognitive biases for negatively valenced stimuli.  However, more 
recently, it has been hypothesized that anxious individuals demonstrate an increase in 
 
                
integrative processing of negatively valenced information, while depressed individuals 
demonstrate an increase in elaborative processing of negatively valenced stimuli 
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).  Integration refers to automatic 
cognitive processing that temporarily intensifies a mental representation, while 
elaboration refers to volitional cognitive processing that strengthens associations between 
mental representations (Graf & Mandler, 1984).  Researchers have investigated implicit 
and explicit measures of depression and anxiety, and the outcome is mixed.  Some studies 
using probe detection tasks and variants of the Stroop color-naming task support that 
anxious individuals demonstrate implicit selective encoding and memory bias for threat-
related stimuli, especially self-relevant stimuli.  In addition, those individuals with a 
vulnerability to anxiety experiencing induced state anxiety exhibit these encoding and 
memory biases as well.  Yet these groups do not demonstrate differences from non-
anxious individuals in explicit memory (see MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998, for review).   
In contrast to these findings in anxiety, MacLeod and Rutherford cite several studies in 
which depressed individuals did not demonstrate significant differences in selective 
encoding and implicit memory from nondepressed individuals.  They did however find 
that depressed individuals but not nondepressed individuals showed an explicit memory 
recall advantage for negative words.  Other studies have compared implicit and explicit 
information processing in individuals endorsing depressive symptoms and individuals 
reporting anxious symptoms within the same study, as this method more directly assesses 
differences in information processing (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995).  For example, 
Bradley and colleagues (1995) used a primed lexical decision task and incidental free 
recall of self-referenced words to investigate implicit and explicit memory in clinical 
 
                
depression and anxiety.  They concluded that depression but not anxiety is associated 
with mood-congruent biases in explicit and implicit memory.  In an earlier study (1994) 
they found that greater subliminal priming of depression-relevant words than neutral 
words in a high negative affect group versus a control group was more correlated with 
depression than anxiety measures.  In another study, researchers found no significant 
implicit and explicit memory biases (assessed using a word stem completion task and free 
recall task, respectively) among depression and panic groups; however, there were trends 
for affective congruency in the explicit measure for both groups (Banos et al., 2001).  
Overall, there are mixed findings regarding biases in processing implicit negative and 
positive stimuli in depressed and anxious individuals compared to each other and control 
groups.  Some studies found implicit mood-congruent memory in depressed individuals 
but not anxious individuals, and some studies found the opposite outcome.  Some studies 
found implicit mood-congruent memory neither in depressed individuals nor anxious 
individuals.  However, most studies have found explicit mood-congruent memory in 
depressed individuals.    
Automaticity of Beliefs about Future 
According to Beck’s theory of depression, negative beliefs about self, world, and 
future contribute to the onset of depression (Beck, 1967, 1976).  Depressed individuals 
often endorse hopelessness about the their futures (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1967), 
in that unpleasant future events are perceived as certain to transpire and desired future 
events are treated as certain not to occur (Andersen, 1990).    It is hypothesized that 
nondepressed individuals do not show any predictive certainty, while depressive 
predictive certainty increases as depressed mood worsens (Andersen).  Furthermore, 
 
                
predictive certainty may be schematic in nature, in that through experience and rehearsal, 
depressed individuals may form a schema for predicting negative future events (Andersen 
et al., 1992).  These schemata may facilitate their making automatic judgments about the 
future.  Andersen and colleagues used a dual-task paradigm to investigate automaticity, 
predicting that depressed individuals would automatically process predictions about 
positive and negative future events, while mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals 
would not automatically process such predictions.  They stated that automaticity would 
be demonstrated if the increase in response latency in the cognitive load condition versus 
the no cognitive load condition were less for the depressed group than for the other two 
groups.  Participants were asked to make predictions about the future, using either 
themselves or the average student as the object of the predictions.  They pressed either 
“yes” or “no” as rapidly as possible on a response box in front of a computer screen, 
indicating whether a positive or negative event would be likely to happen in the future, 
while experiencing either the presence or absence of cognitive load.  Depressed 
participants responded “Yes” to more negative events and “No” to more positive events 
than mildly depressed and nondepressed participants.  The investigators suggested that 
depressed individuals demonstrated automatic processing since the cognitive load did not 
increase their response latencies, yet mildly depressed and nondepressed participants 
endorsed longer latencies with cognitive load.  However, there was a depression by load 
interaction, which showed a trend for depressed participants to respond “Yes” to fewer 
events in the load condition than the no load condition.  This makes the interpretation of 
automaticity less clear.   Andersen and Limpert (2001) conducted a second study using 
the same paradigm but with participants with major depressive disorder (versus moderate 
 
                
depression in the 1992 study), and their results yielded similar findings.  The results of 
these studies suggest that depressed individuals may automatically believe that various 
negative future events will most likely occur in their lives.  Since this happens 
automatically, depressed individuals may not engage in the intentional act of weighing 
the evidence for and against such a bleak future.   
Implicit Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem and self-concept have been assessed via implicit measures 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), based on the assumption that the self is an attitude object 
and a schema that is automatically processed and affects information processing 
(Farnham et al., 1999).  Gemar et al. (2001) used the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) in 
comparing associative biases among the following groups: never depressed, formerly 
depressed, and currently depressed.  They used two types of judgment tasks, “Self” and 
“Adjective”.  For the “Adjective” judgments, participants judged whether adjectives were 
positive or negative and pressed the corresponding computer keys designated as 
“Positive” and “Negative”.  The “Self” judgments (“Me”/”Not Me”) consisted of neutral 
demographic data, such as the participant’s address.  Both tasks used the same response 
keys, and the keys for the “Adjective” (“Negative”/”Positive”) judgment were switched 
midway through the experiment.  It was implied that information about the self had a 
negative association when participants pressed “Me” responses quicker when “Me” 
shared the response key with “Negative” than when “Me” shared the response key with 
“Positive”.  The results indicated that formerly depressed participants showed this 
negative association after undergoing sad-mood induction for material related to self 
only.  Since the depressed group did not undergo mood induction, their scores were not 
 
                
entered into the main analyses; however, t-tests showed that the “Me” associative bias of 
the recovered group before mood induction was more positive than that of the currently 
depressed group.  However, after the recovered group underwent the mood induction, 
their response time differences were equivalent to those of the depressed mood group.  
The results of this study suggest that formerly depressed individuals may be vulnerable to 
forming automatic associations congruent with a negative self-concept if they experience 
a transient depressed mood.  These associations may be just as strong as those found in 
currently depressed individuals.   
Automatic Self-Referential Information Processing 
Several studies have investigated self-referent information processing based on 
Beck’s model that depressed individuals tend to endorse negative thought patterns 
pertaining to self (Beck, 1967, 1976).  Depressive individuals are prone to negative self-
evaluation, especially in achievement and interpersonal performances, and they are apt to 
expect failure and underestimate the level of their performance, yet they do not view 
others in the same negative light (Moretti & Shaw, 1989).  Depressed individuals develop 
a negative self-schema through which they filter stimuli, acknowledging confirming 
evidence of negative self-concept and ignoring data disconfirming negative self-concept 
(Beck, 1967, 1976).  In the same vein, it has been hypothesized that depressed individuals 
process stimuli that are in accordance with self-schema more efficiently than those 
stimuli that are incongruent with self-schema (Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982).  A modified 
version of the Stroop color-word test was used to assess information processing in mildly 
depressed individuals, with the prediction that greater accessibility of negative self-
concepts leads to more interference between the meaning of depressed-content words and 
 
                
the color-naming task (Gotlib & McCann, 1984).  They found that depressed individuals 
(but not nondepressed individuals) demonstrated increased response latencies for color 
naming of depressed-content words compared to manic-content or neutral words. Some 
theorize that according to Bower’s (1981) neural network theory, the interconnectedness 
of the cognitive system would mean that exposing depressed individuals to emotion 
components of their self-constructs would prime other related emotion nodes relating to 
their self-concept.  Several researchers have added priming conditions to their studies of 
information processing.  Gotlib and Cane (1987) found similar results as Gotlib and 
McCann in the modified Stroop task, using priming of negative and positive word 
conditions in clinically depressed patients who were hospitalized; however, after 
discharge, this difference in color naming response time of depressed content versus 
nondepressed content words disappeared.   They did not find evidence that priming 
affects negative construct accessibility.  However, other investigators found that 
depressed individuals primed by self-descriptive negative emotional phrases showed 
increased response time to color naming in the modified Stroop task when negative 
adjectives were displayed as compared to the other prime-target adjective conditions 
(Segal, Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995).  There was no significant effect 
for any prime-target condition in depressed participants when positive material was used, 
and nondepressed participants did not show an effect for any prime-target condition 
regardless of the valence of the material presented.  These studies suggest that depressed 
individuals but not nondepressed individuals may have an attentive bias for negative 
content stimuli that interferes with information processing of other stimuli.  At times, this 
interference may be increased if individuals are primed by negative content stimuli 
 
                
pertaining to self.  For example, a depressed factory worker receives criticism from a 
supervisor regarding the accuracy of his inventory, and later, while attempting to 
concentrate on his work, he overhears co-workers quietly discussing mistakes that were 
made in purchasing, and he is unable to focus as well on his work.   
Barton and Morley (1999) used a sentence completion measure to investigate 
depressed individual’s reference patterns.  To address an interpersonal domain, they 
extended Beck’s triad to include the influence of other people in agent roles, and they 
included past events to avoid confirmation bias.  They used 48 sentence completion stems 
with a variety of pronouns and positive, negative, and neutral verbs (e.g., “Five years 
ago”, “I trust”, “Some people regret”, and “They think”).  They found that with self in the 
agent role, negatively valenced statements regarding self, world, and future were 
significantly correlated with depression; however, in the other-agent condition, only 
negative references to the self were significantly correlated with depression.  These 
findings suggest that although depressed individuals may have a negative self-concept, 
they do not see others in a negative way.  However, depressed individuals may perceive 
that others view them in a negative light.    
Automatic Processing of Self-Relevant Information 
 In addition to the significance of self-referential stimuli in depression, Gotlib and 
Neubauer (2000) emphasize that attentional biases in depression are affected by self-
relevance of stimuli (congruency hypothesis), and investigators are more apt to find 
attentional biases in depressed individuals if they use idiographic stimuli related to the 
individual’s depressive symptoms.  Bargh and Tota (1988) investigated the automaticity 
of negative thought processes using a forced-choice decision paradigm with and without 
 
                
cognitive load.  Depressed and non-depressed participants were asked whether depressed-
content or nondepressed-content adjectives were similar to either self-descriptive or 
“average” person descriptive adjectives.  Depressed participants endorsed equal response 
latencies for self-referent type judgments of depressed-content adjectives in both 
cognitive load conditions (presence and absence), and self-referential type judgment 
latencies of nondepressed-content adjectives were increased in the presence versus the 
absence of cognitive load.  Nondepressed participants endorsed the opposite outcome; 
when self-referential judgments were made under cognitive load, they endorsed increased 
response latencies for depressed-content adjectives.  Both groups of participants 
exhibited longer response latencies for judgments of other-referent negative adjectives in 
the presence versus the absence of cognitive load.  These results suggest that depressed 
individuals automatically process negative self-referential material, yet they do not 
automatically process negative other-referential information.   
Investigators have studied information processing of self-relevant stimuli in 
depressed individuals in the area of personality, specifically, autonomy and sociotropy.  
According to Beck (1983), sociotropy and autonomy are personality dimensions that play 
a role in the onset of depression.  Sociotropy is described as a set of beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors that pertain to an individual’s dependence on others for personal fulfillment 
(Beck).  Sociotropic individuals tend to excessively focus on seeking approval and 
avoiding disapproval from others (Beck).   They seek interpersonal gratification such as 
intimacy, protection, sharing, and help (Sato & McCann, 1997).  They depend on 
attention, approval, and love from others to sustain their self-esteem, and are at risk for 
depression if receipt of such interpersonal support is threatened (e.g., receipt of criticism 
 
                
from a friend) (Fairbrother & Moretti, 1998).  Autonomy is described as a set of beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors that contribute to an individual’s sense of independence and goal 
achievement (Beck).  These individuals strive to attain self-reliance, reach personal 
achievement-oriented goals, and exert control over their own activities and rights (Beck).  
They may be at risk for depression when one of these areas of focus is threatened (e.g., 
failing an exam) (Beck).  These vulnerability dimensions are hypothesized to develop 
from childhood experiences and further develop in cognitive distortions in later life, 
representing significant factors in the diathesis-stress model of depression (Beck).   That 
is, an individual’s appraisal of a stressor combined with the stressor itself plays a role in 
the onset of depression. 
One study investigated the congruency hypothesis in sociotropy, the relationship 
between sociotropy and negative interpersonal experiences and depression (Dozois & 
Backs-Dermott, 2000).   They attempted to assess schema activation and cognitive 
processing via a modified interpersonal Stroop task, primed with an interpersonal 
rejection situation.  They hypothesized that the processing of positive and negative 
interpersonally relevant stimuli would vary based on the congruency between an 
individual’s personality vulnerability and type of priming (failure v. rejection imagery).  
Participants listened to a monologue and were asked to imagine that they themselves 
were experiencing the situation.   Participants were asked to indicate whether or not 
positive and negative interpersonally relevant words described them.  These same words 
were used in an interpersonal Stroop task.  As is typical in this task, response times were 
used as the dependent variable.  The results indicated that sociotropic individuals showed 
greater attentional biases toward negative self-referential stimuli when primed with a 
 
                
congruent imaginal situation than individuals who did not experience a congruent prime.  
The differences were only significant when response times for self-relevant words were 
included in the analyses.  These findings are consistent with earlier discussion of the 
congruency hypothesis for self-relevant information processing.   
Implicit Cognitive Processes in State Versus Trait Depression 
One of the objectives of research encompassing cognitive processes in depression 
is to differentiate between dysfunctional cognitive processes that form part of a 
vulnerability factor and those that are a result of current mood state (Eysenck, 1991).  
Eysenck theorizes that dysfunctional automatic processes are most likely a function of a 
vulnerability factor, and dysfunctional controlled processes are more apt to be explained 
by current mood state.  This hypothesis is in part congruent with Beck’s theory, in that 
negative schemata may be associated with cognitive vulnerability for depression (1967, 
1976).  The findings of some studies suggest that depressive automatic attributions were 
more closely linked to depression vulnerability than to current depression (see Hartlage et 
al., 1993 for a review).  In one study, 42 female participants completed the BDI-SF as 
part of a larger battery 12 months prior to the experiment (Williams & Nulty, 1986).  The 
participants completed another BDI-SF at the time of the experiment, and were grouped 
into the following four categories: depressed at both times, depressed at neither time, 
depressed at time 1 but not time 2, depressed at time 2 but not time 1.  They found the 
strongest results in the two groups who were depressed or nondepressed at both times, in 
that depressed individuals showed the greatest interference on a modified Stroop Task 
when negative emotion words were displayed, and nondepressed individuals showed the 
least interference.  In addition, they found that individuals who had changed groups from 
 
                
depressed at time 1 to nondepressed at time 2 showed a significant correlation of -.79, 
indicating that as BDI score decreased, interference on the emotion Stroop task increased.  
These results suggest that the emotion Stroop interference effect cannot be explained 
simply by transient mood, but rather vulnerability to depression plays a role in selective 
attention to negative emotion stimuli.  In the same vein, investigators hypothesized that 
individuals who are cognitively vulnerable to depression endorse comparable negative 
self-referent processing as those who are depressed (Alloy, Abramson, Murray, 
Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997), suggesting that those who are vulnerable to depression 
may be at risk for experiencing a depressive episode given that they may process 
information about the self in a negatively biased fashion similar to those who endorse 
current symptoms of depression.  Alloy and colleagues found that high cognitive risk 
participants (based on level of risk assessed from dysfunctional attitudes and inferential 
styles measures) demonstrated greater processing of negative self-referent information 
and less processing of positive self-referent information than low risk participants.  On 
the contrary, it has been argued that individuals vulnerable to depression will process 
implicit information similarly to never depressed individuals unless they experience 
current depressed mood (Miranda & Persons, 1988).  One study found that negative 
construct accessibility assessed through a modified Stroop task significantly differed 
between nondepressed controls and hospitalized depressed individuals.  However, when 
the depressed patients were discharged and endorsed decreased symtomatology, there 
were no longer significant differences in negative construct accessibility between patients 
and never depressed controls (Gotlib & Cane, 1987).  There are mixed findings to explain 
implicit cognitive processing of negative stimuli in individuals vulnerable to depression.  
 
                
There is some support indicating vulnerability alone is sufficient for such dysfunction in 
implicit cognitive processing, while other findings support that in addition to 
vulnerability to depression, current depressed mood is necessary to trigger implicit 
cognitive processing of negative stimuli.   
Implications of Implicit Cognitive Processes Research in Depression 
Increasing understanding of implicit cognitive processes in depression has 
implications for improving assessment and treatment of depression.  Studying depression 
from an explicit/implicit view may provide answers in the following areas:  (1) how 
stress precipitates a depressive episode, (2) how people become vulnerable to depression, 
and (3) why depression persists (Hartlage et al., 1993).  Hartlage and colleagues 
hypothesize that stress leads to narrowing of cognitive capacity, resulting in greater 
dependence on automatic processing.  Furthermore, depression-prone individuals may 
automatically process negative features of a stressful situation, consequently recalling 
more negative experiences, and they may not be able to lessen their negative thoughts 
through effortful strategies (e.g. problem solving).  This style becomes more practiced 
and more automatic.  Although individuals may become aware of automatic thoughts (as 
defined by Beck), underlying schemata may be more difficult to access and change.  
Implicit measures may provide a means of access to underlying schemata, and change or 
progress in altering schemata or at least the degree of accessibility to these dysfunctional 
schemata may be monitored via implicit measures.  Clinicians may be able to assess and 
treat underlying dysfunctional automatic cognitive processes (e.g. minor depression) 
before depressive symptoms become more serious (e.g. major depressive disorder).  
Clinicians may also use implicit assessment as a tool in relapse prevention.  Thus 
 
                
individualized implicit assessment measures of depression may be used in addition to 
self-report measures, since implicit measures may capture a different dimension of 
cognitive processing.  In addition, assessing implicit processes may provide data to 
support cognitive and emotion network models of depression.   
Future Directions of Automaticity Research in Depression 
Employing information-processing models to investigate biases in attention and 
memory in depression may provide additional information to what is generated from self-
report methods (Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000).   However, Gotlib and Neubauer report that 
findings regarding biases in depressed individuals are mixed.  They explain that 
inconsistencies across studies may be due to several factors: (1) Attentional biases in 
depression may be in part a result of comorbid anxiety; (2) Different studies use varying 
degrees of stimuli relevance to depressed individuals’ concerns; (3) Studies use tasks 
with varying number of stimuli for individuals to process simultaneously; and (4) Some 
studies encourage guessing, and responses may result from different ways of making 
judgments as opposed to attentional processing.   Researchers should consider these 
criticisms in designing future research of implicit cognitive processes.   
Very few studies have investigated implicit evaluative biases in depressed 
individuals using an association task.  In this study, automatic associations involving self-
concept were investigated in depressed individuals; however, it could not be determined 
that purely implicit processes were measured.  Anxiety was controlled for statistically in 
secondary analyses, since many researchers proposed that there is a difference in implicit 
cognitive processing between depressed and anxious individuals.  Many studies have 
shown that there is a greater effect of implicit cognitive processing when stimuli are 
 
                
related to the concerns of depressed individuals.  Some studies have used word stimuli 
that participants chose as self-descriptive; however, in this study, a depressive personality 
measure was used to find some degree of relevance of stimuli.  If this study included a 
true idiographic assessment, a comprehensive psychological assessment would have been 
required, including extensive interviewing and psychological testing.  However, it can be 
argued that assessment involving self-report may not accurately describe a person’s 
concerns.  In this study, participants were assessed for degree of sociotropy and 
autonomy, and participants were presented with stimuli pertaining to these constructs. 
Further research is necessary in comparing implicit measures that purport to 
measure similar constructs.  For example, Bosson and colleagues investigated the 
correlation among seven implicit measures of self-esteem and found primarily weak 
positive correlations and weak negative correlations (2000).  However, in their study, 
they used measures of varying implicitness.  If one considers the continuum of 
automaticity, an individual’s response on one “completely implicit” measure of self-
esteem may not correlate strongly with another measure of implicit self-esteem that is 
less indirect.  One goal for researchers of implicit processes in depression may be to 
design a battery of implicit measures that complement one another, using different 
methods but assessing a similar construct.  Investigators may use implicit measures that 
include idiographic assessment of individuals to capture their relevant concerns and use 
stimuli that are self-referent.  In addition, they may consider using measures that are 
similar in the degree of implicitness so that they may capture the same level of 
processing.  There have been few studies that have attempted this.  In this study, a test to 
assess automatic associations in self-concept as well as an implicit memory measure were 
 
                
used.  It was expected that self-concept schemata would be activated in both making 
associations of negative self-relevant stimuli with self-concept and in accessing memory 
for these negative self-relevant stimuli.  In this study, individuals’ responses on implicit 
measures of depression were compared to their responses on explicit measures of 
depression.  It was hypothesized that implicit and explicit measures would be weakly 
correlated, since they may measure two different types of processing, one that the 
individual has awareness of and the other that may be operating in parallel but for which 
the individual is unaware.  However, it was beyond the scope of this study to further 
examine why these differences may occur.      
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested in this study: 
1. There will be differences in task responses on implicit measures between and 
within depressed and never depressed individuals.  Depressed individuals will 
show stronger associations of self-concept with negative stimuli than positive 
stimuli, while never depressed individuals will show the opposite pattern.  There 
will be significant differences in self-concept associations between depressed and 
never depressed individuals, in that the depressed group will demonstrate a 
greater association than the never depressed group between self and negative 
stimuli.  In addition, depressed individuals will have greater implicit memory for 
depressed content words than positive words, while never depressed individuals 
will show the opposite pattern.  The depressed group will demonstrate greater 
implicit memory than the never depressed group for depressed content stimuli. 
 
                
2. Depressed individuals who score high on sociotropy will show a greater self-
concept negative sociotropic bias than a general negative bias.  In addition, their 
response times in making associations between self-concept and negative 
sociotropic content stimuli will be faster than those low on sociotropy and those 
never depressed.  High autonomy depressed individuals will exhibit a greater self-
concept negative autonomous bias than a general negative bias.   In addition, their 
response times in making associations between self-concept and negative 
autonomous content stimuli will be faster than those low on autonomy and those 
never depressed.  High sociotropic depressed individuals will demonstrate 
greatest implicit memory of sociotropic words, while high autonomous depressed 
individuals will demonstrate greatest implicit memory for autonomous content 
words.  In addition, depressed sociotropic individuals will exhibit greater implicit 
memory for sociotropic content stimuli than those low on sociotropy and those 
never depressed, and depressed autonomous individuals will show greater implicit 
memory for autonomous content stimuli than those low on autonomy and those 
never depressed.   
3. Implicit measures will correlate more highly with each other than they will 
correlate with explicit measures, since implicit measures, even if varying in 
degree of indirectness, will more likely measure the same processes than clearly 
explicit measures. 
 
 
 
 
                
2.  Method 
Design 
The study design included one between-groups factor (groups: depressed high 
autonomy (n = 8), depressed not high autonomy (n = 7), depressed high sociotropy (n = 
8), depressed not high sociotropy (n = 7), and never depressed (n = 15) and one within-
groups factor (task response for negative sociotropic, negative autonomous, depressive 
content, and positive affective stimuli).  Some participants fell into more than one group.  
For example, a participant could score high on both sociotropy and autonomy or score 
low on both sociotropy and autonomy.  Depressed participants were split into high and 
low autonomy and sociotropy groups based on a median split.  Participants were recruited 
from clinics in Salt Lake City, and the control group was approximately matched with the 
depressed group for education level and gender.  Participants completed self-report 
measures of depression, anxiety, and autonomy/sociotropy within three days preceding 
the implicit association test and word stem completion task.  
Participants 
 Fifteen participants at least 18 years of age with a diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder, dysthymic disorder, or depressive disorder NOS were recruited from Valley 
Mental Health in Salt Lake City.   The investigator obtained confirmation of the 
participant’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, or depressive 
disorder NOS from the patient’s therapist at the time of enrollment.  Master- or Doctoral-
level licensed therapists from the outpatient clinics determined a psychiatric diagnosis 
based on an unstructured clinical interview and review by a treatment team or intake team 
that included psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and psychiatric nurses.  
 
                
Depressed participants were included if they scored 15 or higher on the BDI-II (Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996), as other studies have used similar BDI cut-off scores (Andersen 
et al., 1992; Watkins et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 1996).  Participants were excluded if 
they had a diagnosis of major depressive disorder with psychotic features or a psychotic 
disorder.  Fifteen never depressed participants who were employed at Valley Mental 
Health sites in Salt Lake City were recruited.  Never depressed participants were 
excluded if they ever experienced a depressive episode in the past or were experiencing 
depressed mood at the time of the experiment, as indicated by an unstructured clinical 
interview based on DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for major 
depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder.  In addition, never depressed participants 
were excluded if they scored high on the Personal Style Inventory (PSI); that is, above 94 
on the autonomy scale or above 107 on the sociotropy scale, based on the 75th quartiles of 
a study conducted by Robins and colleagues with a sample size of 411 participants 
(1994).  Never depressed participants were included if they scored 12 or below on the 
BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), as other studies have used similar BDI cut-off 
scores (Andersen et al., 1992; Watkins et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 1996).  The researcher 
approximately matched never depressed participants for education level and gender with 
depressed participants.  Thus, depressed participants were recruited based on current 
diagnoses and their scores on the BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), while never 
depressed participants were recruited based on unstructured clinical interviews, BDI-II 
scores, and PSI (Robins et al.) scores.   All participants were required to be fluent and 
literate in English.  Three participants in the depressed group were excluded because they 
were no longer experiencing clinically significant depressive symptoms and scored below 
 
                
15 on the BDI-II.  Five participants in the never depressed group were excluded because 
they met criteria for a history of a depressive diagnosis.  No participants were excluded 
based on PSI scores.    
Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)   
 The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure that has been widely used to assess 
the presence and severity of depressive symptoms.  The BDI-II manual (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown) reports a correlation of .93 between the BDI-II and the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) in 
a sample of 191 outpatients.  The manual also reports that the BDI-II correlates .68 with 
the Revised Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1960) and 
correlates .71 with the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck & Steer, 1988). The BDI-II 
manual reported alpha coefficients of .91 and higher as evidence for the instrument's 
internal consistency.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 
1983)   
The STAI is a widely used self-report measure assessing anxiety as an emotional 
state and as a personality trait (Murphy, Conoley, & Impara, 1994).  The psychometric 
data that follows is from the Eighth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Buros, 1978).  The 
STAI consists of 40 items, 20 items assessing state anxiety or how the individual feels 
currently, and 20 items assessing trait anxiety or how the individual feels generally.  The 
reviewers summarize that the STAI is a relatively efficient, reliable, and valid measure of 
state and trait anxiety.  Test-retest reliabilities for state and trait scores for a one-hour 
interval are .33 (males) and .16 (females) and .84 (males) and .76 (females) respectively.  
 
                
Alpha reliability coefficients for the normative samples range from .83 to .92 for state 
scores and .86 to .92 for trait scores.  Convergent validity of the STAI with the IPAT 
Anxiety Scale, Manifest Anxiety Scale, and Affect Adjective Checklist were .75, .80, and 
.52 respectively.  The reviewers state that the STAI shows good internal consistency.   
Personal Style Inventory, Version II (PSI: Robins et al., 1994)   
The PSI is a 6-point self-rating measure assessing sociotropy and autonomy, 
consisting of two scales of 24-items each.  Using a college student sample, Robins and 
colleagues found good internal consistency for both scales, Sociotropy (alpha=.88) and 
Autonomy (alpha=.86) and the correlation between the two scales was low, r(411)=.18.  
In terms of construct validity, they found positive modest correlation with the BDI for 
Sociotropy (r=.20) and Autonomy (r=.27), and the Sociotropy scale was very highly 
correlated with the Revised Depressive Experience Questionnaire Dependency scale 
(RDEQ: Welkowitz, Lish, & Bond, 1985), r=.84.  Autonomy correlated moderately 
highly with the Self-Criticism scale of the RDEQ, r=.50.  Test-retest reliability was high 
for a 5- to 13-week period (n=74) for Sociotropy (r=.80) and Autonomy (r=.70).         
Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald et al., 1998) 
The IAT was developed to measure individual differences in implicit cognition 
and has been used to measure self-concept and self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000) and associations in recovered depressed patients (Gemar et al., 2001).  The IAT is 
designed to assess implicit attitudes, that is, attitudes that are automatically activated in 
an individual without his or her awareness or control (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  The 
IAT is used to assess this automatic activation by measuring the difference between 
response times in associating different concepts and attributes (Greenwald et al.).  The 
 
                
underlying assumption, based on neural network theory, is that strongly associated 
attribute-concept pairs should be easier to classify together than are weakly associated or 
incompatible attribute-concept pairs (Farnham et al., 1999).  This is measured by 
response time differences or errors in making these associations.  Greenwald and 
Farnham (2000) discuss the validity of the IAT in general.  For example, they refer to 
Greenwald and colleagues’ study in which IAT measures demonstrated stability across 
various procedural alterations (such as key assignment), time interval between onset of 
stimuli, and number of stimuli presented in one trial.  However, it is more difficult to 
establish psychometric properties of implicit attitude measures since there is a high 
degree of intrinsic measurement error in latency-based measures (Cunningham, Preacher, 
& Banaji, 2001).  Cunningham and colleagues were able to correct for measurement error 
by using a latent variable approach to estimate stability and convergent validity of the 
IAT.  They used a sample of 93 participants and administered three implicit attitude 
measures of race (IAT, response-window associative priming, and response-window 
IAT) and one explicit attitude measure (Modern Racism Scale) four times.  They found 
that the interitem consistency for the IAT was acceptable, Cronbach’s alpha = .78.  After 
separating out measurement error from estimates of stability using a latent variable 
method, they found a stability index of .68 for the IAT.  In investigating convergent 
validity, Cunningham and colleagues found that all of the latent variable correlations 
were statistically significant, r=.63, although the simple bivariate correlations were only 
r=.19.  Thus, they reported greater convergent validity using a latent variable method of 
analysis than a traditional bivariate correlation.  Also, each of the three implicit measures 
was significantly correlated with the explicit measure, the Modern Racism Scale, mean 
 
                
r=.35; however, they state that the implicit tests are measuring something distinct from 
the explicit measure.  Although the implicit measures found that participants made racist 
associations, participants scored significantly below the midpoint of the self-report 
racism scale.   
Word Stem Completion Task (WSCT)   
The WSCT was used as a second implicit measure of depression for comparison 
of two implicit measures of depression.  It was expected that the WSCT would be 
positively correlated with the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) since both are based on self-
concept using the same stimuli.  They were not expected to be highly correlated since one 
assesses automatic associations (IAT) and the other implicit memory (WSCT).  The 
WSCT has been widely used in the assessment of implicit memory (Banos et al., 2001; 
Denny & Hunt, 1992; Lang & Craske, 1997).  Implicit memory is assessed with a WSCT 
in conjunction with priming, in that prior exposure to words may facilitate performance 
on a task without the individual’s realization of the association (Graf & Schacter, 1985).  
Individuals are given the first few letters of a target word and are asked to complete the 
word as quickly as possible with the first word that comes to mind (Bradley et al., 1994).   
Implicit memory is indicated when individuals complete more word stems with primed 
words than unprimed words (Banos et al.).  Neuroimaging experiments have 
demonstrated that there is decreased cortical activity in several areas during priming 
(Schacter & Buckner, 1998), and numerous studies have found dissociations between 
explicit and implicit memory using the word stem completion task (Cloitre, Shear, 
Cancienne, & Zeitlin, 1994).  Jacoby (1991) recommends using his process-dissociation 
procedure as a more stringent method of separating implicit from explicit influences in 
 
                
completing a task, since participants may purposefully use memory for word stimuli 
presented during a prior task to complete word stems, even though they are not instructed 
to do so.  Jacoby, Toth, and Yonelinas (1993) explain that this method combines 
outcomes of an exclusion task (do not use words from the prior task) and inclusion task 
(use words from the prior task) by measuring the difference between performance when 
trying versus trying not to complete word stems as instructed.  They state that if the 
participant is as likely to complete word stems with words from a prior task when trying 
not to as when trying to do so, then the participant has no control.  Jacoby and 
colleagues’ model is based on the assumption that unconscious and conscious memory 
systems are independent; however, others have argued that alternative models may be 
used that assume some degree of redundancy (Cowan & Stadler, 1996; Joordens & 
Merikle, 1993).   Although the estimate of the unconscious processes involved in the task 
may vary according to the model adopted, the advantage in using this procedure is that 
there is an experimental method to separate to some degree implicit from explicit 
processes.    
Materials and Apparatus 
 Both implicit tasks described below were executed on IBM-compatible laptops.  
FIAT for Windows software program (Farnham, 1998) was used to control presentation 
of stimuli and record response times for the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).  Software for 
presentation of stimuli and recording of responses for the WSCT was designed by a 
computer programmer consultant.  A keyboard was connected to the laptop for 
participants to respond to stimuli.  There were 120 different stimulus words and 180 
different 2- or 3- or 4-letter word stems presented to each participant. 
 
                
Procedure 
Recruitment 
  Approvals from the Internal Review Boards at Drexel University College of 
Medicine and the Utah Department of Human Services were obtained.  Written consent 
was obtained from those participants who qualified for the study and verbally agreed to 
participate.  Participants who completed the study requirements as outlined in the consent 
form received $10 compensation, and those who completed part of the study 
requirements received $2.       
Experiment 
Participants completed the BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), STAI 
(Spielberger et al., 1983), and PSI (Robins et al., 1994) within three days of completing 
the experiment.  Participants first completed the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) that served 
as a priming task for the second implicit measure, the WSCT.  Thus, words in the IAT 
were presented without instruction that these words would be used later in the WSCT, 
and exposure to word stimuli in the IAT was hypothesized to facilitate completion of 
word stems with words that were presented in the IAT.  All participants completed the 
experiment individually.  Participants were debriefed after the experiment. 
 IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).  The procedure that follows was based largely on 
Gemar and colleagues’ (2001) method.  Participants provided 15 specific personal 
demographic and other data to be used as ostensibly affectively neutral “Me” stimuli for 
“Self” category judgments (first name, middle name, last name, birth date, birth year, 
city, state, zip code, country, zodiac sign, age, ethnicity, gender, handedness, and phone 
number) prior to the experimental tasks.  In addition, participants chose 15 corresponding 
 
                
“Not Me” ostensibly affectively neutral stimuli approximately matched for length with 
“Me” stimuli.  Before the experiment and during transitions in tasks, participants were 
told that response times would be measured, as this and accuracy together determined 
their level of performance.  During the experiment, the participant judged whether the 
stimulus was “Me” or “Not Me” and responded by pressing the right or left key assigned 
to “Me” or “Not Me” on the keyboard.  Half of the participants were assigned “Me” to 
the right response key, and assignment remained the same for all participants for the 
duration of the experiment.  The second type of stimuli consisted of negative content 
words pertaining to sociotropy, autonomy, and general depressive words and positive 
affective content words.  Participants were presented with 45 negative content words and 
45 positive affective words.  Words were selected from various sources (other 
researchers’ lists, PSI, SAS); however, later the researcher required additional words to 
meet word stem uniqueness, word frequency and word length requirements, thus the 
researcher added word stimuli to the word lists.  These added words were judged by 10 
individuals, and the word stimuli with the highest average ratings were selected for use in 
the program.  Words in different categories were approximately matched for length and 
frequency (Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971) by using a computer program designed by 
a computer programmer consultant.  All words had a unique word stem.  Participants 
judged whether the word was positive or negative and responded by pressing the right or 
left response key.  Half of the participants were assigned “Positive” to the right response 
key, and all participants reversed the response key assignment “Positive” and “Negative” 
half way through the experiment.  This judgment task was referred to as the valence 
judgment.  At the start of the data collection, participants were given 30 practice trials, 10 
 
                
each for the following: self judgments, valence judgments, and the two judgments mixed.  
After completion of the practice trials, participants completed 50 trials of mixed type 
judgments (self judgments interspersed with valence judgments) based on the practiced 
side of the response assignment.  Next, participants repeated the practice trial procedure 
with the new key assignment (“Positive” and “Negative” reverse sides).  After 
completion of the 30 practice trials, participants completed 50 additional trials using the 
reversed side assignment.  Scores on the IAT were calculated for both the “Me” and “Not 
Me” self judgments separately by subtracting the response times for the two response-
matching conditions, that is when self was matched with the same side of the screen as 
“Positive” versus “Negative”.  If there was a significant difference in response time 
depending on matching response sides, there was an associative bias.  It was 
hypothesized that depressed individuals would respond quicker when “Me” was matched 
with “Negative” than when “Me” was matched with “Positive”, and would respond 
quickest when “Me” was matched with self-relevant negative words.   It was 
hypothesized that never depressed individuals would not show this bias but would in fact 
show the opposite bias, faster reaction times when “Me” was matched with “Positive”.               
WSCT.  The following procedure was based on the process dissociation 
procedure used by Jacoby, Toth, and Yonelinas (1993).  After completion of the IAT, 
participants were given 10 practice trials for word stem completion, 5 of which are 
unrelated to the actual task stimuli.  For the inclusion task, participants were instructed to 
complete each word stem with a word they saw during the first task, and if they were not 
able to do so, then they should complete the word stem with the first word to come to 
mind as quickly as possible.  For the exclusion task, participants were instructed to 
 
                
complete each word stem as quickly as possible using a word that was not viewed during 
the first task.  Next, participants were given a total of 180 2-, 3-, or 4-letter word stems in 
semi-random order (no more than three word stems from the same category presented 
contiguously), 15 each previously presented words and 15 each new words from the 
following categories: negative sociotropy, negative autonomy, depressive content, and 
positive affective.  For the inclusion part of the task, participants were instructed to 
complete each word stem with a word they saw during the first task, and if they were not 
able to do so, then they should complete the word stem with the first word to come to 
mind as quickly as possible.  During the exclusion part of the task, participants were 
instructed to complete each word stem as quickly as possible with a word that was not 
presented in the first task.  Color-coding was used to indicate whether the task required 
exclusion or inclusion of previously viewed words, in that green word stems were used 
for inclusion, and red word stems were used for exclusion (Jacoby et al.).  For each 2-, 3-, 
or 4-letter stem there was at least one word that could be formed that was higher in word 
frequency than the target word (Watkins et al., 1992).  If participants completed word 
stems with words that were in a different form from the target words presented in the IAT 
but were semantically similar or were simply misspelled, the words were scored as 
correct responses as long as there was at least one word that could be formed that was 
higher in frequency (Watkins et al.).  Half of the word stems were presented in the 
inclusion task and half in the exclusion task, and these two sets were counterbalanced, so 
that approximately half of the participants in each group received set A word stems in the 
inclusion task and set B word stems in the exclusion task.   
 
 
                
3.  Results 
 Analyses 
A mixed-model MANOVA was run to investigate within- and between-groups 
differences on the IAT based on the two groups depressed and never depressed.  The two 
dependent variables consisted of the association response times when “Me” was mapped 
with positive word stimuli and when “Me” was mapped with general depressive stimuli 
on the IAT.  The FIAT software program generated IAT mean latency scores for each 
critical block, automatically excluding the first two trials of each block and any latency 
over 3000 ms or under 300 ms.  These data were used in the analyses rather than 
individual trial scores, since outliers were already excluded and the database was more 
manageable.    
A mixed-model MANOVA was run to investigate within- and between-groups 
differences on the WSCT based on the two groups depressed and never depressed.  The 
two dependent variables consisted of the automaticity estimate for positive stimuli and 
the automaticity estimate for general depressive stimuli.  
A mixed-model MANOVA was run to investigate within- and between-groups 
differences on the IAT based on depressive personality style.  The independent variables 
were autonomy and sociotropy.  There were three levels for each factor: low and 
depressed, high and depressed, and never depressed.  The three dependent variables 
consisted of the response time differences between the following: positive stimuli 
mapped with “Me” and negative autonomous stimuli mapped with “Me”, positive stimuli 
mapped with “Me” and negative sociotropic stimuli mapped with “Me”, and positive 
stimuli mapped with “Me” and general depressive stimuli mapped with “Me”.  As 
 
                
discussed above, mean latency scores for critical blocks generated by the FIAT software 
program were used in the analyses.   
A mixed-model MANCOVA was run to investigate within- and between-groups 
differences on the WSCT based on a depressive personality style.  The independent 
variables were autonomy and sociotropy.  There were three levels for each factor: low 
and depressed, high and depressed, and never depressed.  The four dependent variables 
consisted of automaticity estimates for positive, general depressive, negative 
autonomous, and negative sociotropic word stimuli.   
Correlation analyses were used to investigate relationships between the two 
implicit measures and between the implicit measures and the explicit measures of 
depression and sociotropy/autonomy.  Data from both depressed and never depressed 
participants were included in the correlation analyses.   
Statistical Findings 
 The sample consisted of 22 female participants and 8 male participants with an 
average age of 44.5 years.  The mean education level was 13.5 years.  Twenty-eight 
Caucasians, one Hispanic, and one Asian participated in the study.  See Table 1 for 
sociodemographic statistics for the depressed and never depressed groups. 
 
   
Table 1 Sociodemographic Descriptive Statistics  
 Never depressed        Depressed      
                     (n=15)     (n=15) 
 M          SD                       M          SD               
Age  41         15  48          13         
Education 13         2  14          2 
Gender n        n
  Female 9  13           
   Male 6  2 
 
                
The mean BDI-II score was 32 for the depressed group and 4 for the never 
depressed group.  The mean STAI-State score was 57 for the depressed group and 31 for 
the never depressed group.  The mean STAI-Trait score was 60 for the depressed group 
and 31 for the never depressed group.  The mean PSI-Autonomy scale score was 94 for 
the depressed group and 65 for the never depressed group.  The mean PSI-Sociotropy 
scale score was 102 for the depressed group and 77 for the never depressed group.  See 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations for the self-report explicit measures.   
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Self-Report Measures  
                   Never depressed               Depressed      
                      (n=15) (n=15) 
  M          SD                       M          SD               
BDI-II   4      4                32  12 
STAI-State  31      8  57         10 
STAI-Trait                                    31      5  60         7 
PSI-Autonomy                              65      16  94         15 
PSI-Sociotropy                             77      19  102       17 
  
 
  
It was expected that there would be significant differences in self-concept 
associative biases within and between groups as suggested by differences in response 
times between when “Me” is mapped with positive stimuli and when “Me” is mapped 
with general depressive stimuli based on depression.   A mixed-model MANOVA 
showed significant results within groups on the IAT, in that participants demonstrated a 
significant positive bias, F(1,28) = 90.59, p=.001, eta squared = .76.  Participants scored 
in a positive direction, in that participants demonstrated faster associations between self 
and positive descriptive stimuli than between self and negative descriptive stimuli (see 
 
                
Table 3).  There were no significant differences between groups on the IAT, F(1,28) = 
.12, p=.73, eta squared = .004. 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the IAT - Depressed and Never Depressed Groups 
                         Never Depressed   Depressed      
  (n=15)  (n=15)  
                                          M          SD                        M          SD                     
IAT        
           
    aNegative              476       307         402       181      
           bNegative-Me          1706     431  1623     410 
           bPositive-Me          1230     378   1221     302 
 
    aAutonomy      453       282   400       243 
           bNegative-Me   1735     443   1637     353 
           bPositive-Me           1282     378   1237     295 
    
    aSociotropy 547       266            324       200 
         bNegative-Me 1716     398   1562     435 
         bPositive-Me     1170     300   1238     314 
aResponse time difference in milliseconds between when “me” is mapped with positive 
words and when “me” is mapped with negative words. bResponse time in milliseconds 
when “Me” is matched with word stimuli. 
  
According to a mixed-model MANOVA, there were no significant differences in 
implicit memory as measured by positive and negative automaticity estimates between 
groups, F(1,28) = .88, p=.36, eta squared = .03 and within groups F(1,28) = 1.35, p=.26, 
eta squared = .03 on the WSCT (see Table 4).     
 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for the WSCT - Depressed and Never Depressed Groups 
                         Never Depressed   Depressed      
  (n=15)  (n=15)  
                                          M          SD                        M          SD                     
 
                
Table 4 (continued) 
 
WSCT 
 
   Positive               .06        .17             .11        .17            
     
  Negative              .02        .17            .09        .13                      
 
 Autonomy    .16        .21             .13        .19    
  
 Sociotropy     .29        .21             .26        .28            
Note.  Unit of measure is probability of automatic influences of memory.  
 
 
 
It was expected that depressed individuals who scored high on sociotropy would 
demonstrate a greater negative sociotropic bias than a general negative associative bias.  
In addition, their response times in making associations between self-concept and 
negative sociotropic content stimuli would be faster (thus a stronger association) than 
those low on sociotropy and those never depressed.  It was also predicted that high 
autonomy depressed individuals would exhibit a greater self-concept negative 
autonomous associative bias than a general depressive bias.   In addition, their response 
times in making associations between self-concept and negative autonomous content 
stimuli would be faster than those low on autonomy and those never depressed.  The 
results of the mixed-model MANOVA showed no significant differences in the overall 
model based on autonomy and sociotropy on the IAT,  F(2,24) = .2, p = .82, eta squared 
= .02 (see Table 5 for groups’ M and SD).  The differences within groups were not 
significant for autonomy, F(2,25) = .11, p = .9, eta squared = .004, and sociotropy, 
F(2,25) = 1.52, p = .23, eta squared = .06.  However, the differences between groups 
based on autonomy approached significance, F(1,25) = 3.94, p = .058, eta squared = .14.  
The three groups scored in a positive direction; however, the never depressed group had 
 
                
the greatest positive bias, second highest was the low autonomy depressed group, and the 
high autonomy depressed group exhibited the least positive bias.  The differences 
between groups based on sociotropy were not significant, F(1,25) = 2.6, p = .12, eta 
squared = .09.   
 
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for the IAT – Autonomy and Sociotropy Factors 
                       Low Sociotropy    High Sociotropy   Low Autonomy    High Autonomy   Never Depressed 
                       (n=7)                    (n=8)                    (n=7)              (n=8)                    (n=15) 
                       M        SD           M          SD            M          SD           M          SD         M          SD
IAT 
           
    Negative      468     213         343       136          534      153          286        114  476       307       
     
    Autonomy   334      251         457         237          455       259          352        234 453       282 
     
    Sociotropy   211      177         423       170          337    210          312        204 547       266 
Note.  Unit of measurement is response time difference in milliseconds between when 
“me” is mapped with negative words and when “me” is mapped with positive words.  
 
It was expected that high sociotropic depressed individuals would demonstrate 
greatest implicit memory of sociotropic words, while high autonomous depressed 
individuals would demonstrate greatest implicit memory of autonomous content words.  
In addition, depressed high sociotropic individuals would exhibit greater implicit memory 
of sociotropic content stimuli than those depressed and low on sociotropy and those never 
depressed, and depressed high autonomous individuals would show greater implicit 
memory for autonomous content stimuli than those depressed and low on autonomy and 
those never depressed.  The results of a mixed-model MANOVA were significant overall, 
F(2,24) = 6.44, p = .006, eta squared = .35.  There were significant differences within 
depressive personality style groups in implicit memory, F(2,50) = 7.32, p = .002, eta 
squared = .23.  All groups showed highest implicit memory of negative sociotropic words 
 
                
(see Table 6 for groups’ M and SD).  There were no significant differences between 
groups in implicit memory based on autonomy, F(1,25) = .19, p = .66, eta squared = .008 
and sociotropy, F(1,25) = 1.25, p = .28, eta squared = .05.   
  
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for the WSCT – Autonomy and Sociotropy Factors 
                         Low Sociotropy    High Sociotropy    Low Autonomy    High Autonomy    Never Depressed 
                     (n=7)                (n=8)                (n=7)            (n=8)                 (n=15) 
                      M        SD        M        SD        M        SD        M        SD         M        SD
WSCT 
 
     Positive      .09       .10        .12       .21        .14      .17        .07       .17         .06       .17                      
     
    Negative     .04       .15        .13       .10        .12      .14        .06       .12         .02       .17 
     
    Autonomy   .12       .15        .14       .24        .09      .11        .17       .25         .16       .21 
     
    Sociotropy  .22       .27        .29       .30        .27      .37        .25       .20         .29       .21 
Note.  Unit of measure is probability of automatic influences of memory. 
 
  
 It was expected that the implicit measures would be more highly correlated with 
each other than with an explicit measure.  Correlation analyses were run among all of the 
explicit and implicit measures.  There were mixed findings, in that results indicated six 
significant correlations between explicit measures, two significant correlations between 
implicit measures, and three significant correlations between implicit and explicit 
measures (see Table 7).  Not surprisingly the BDI-II was significantly positively 
correlated with the PSI Autonomy (r = .8, p< .001) and Sociotropy (r = .61, p < .001) 
scales, and the two PSI scales were significantly positively correlated with each other (r = 
.79, p < .001).  The WSCT recollection measures were all significantly positively 
correlated with each other (positive, autonomous, and sociotropic words; see Table 7).  
The IAT negative difference score was significantly positively correlated with the IAT 
 
                
autonomy difference score (r = .48, p = .007).  Thus, as individuals showed a greater 
positive self-concept bias when “me” was mapped with positive versus negative words, 
they also showed a greater positive bias when “me” was mapped with positive words 
versus negative autonomy words.  The WSCT automaticity estimates for positive and 
negative stimuli were significantly positively correlated, (r = .5, p = .005), indicating that 
as implicit memory for positive words increased so did implicit memory for negative 
words.  There was a significant negative correlation between the PSI Autonomy scale and 
the IAT sociotropy difference score (r = -.48, p = .007); thus, as individuals scored higher 
on an explicit autonomy measure, they demonstrated a lower positive self-concept bias 
on an implicit measure of sociotropy.  In addition, there was a significant negative 
correlation between the IAT sociotropy difference score and the BDI-II (r = -.41, p =.03), 
indicating that as individuals scored higher on an explicit depression measure, they 
demonstrated a lower positive self-concept bias on an implicit measure of sociotropy.  
Lastly, there was a significant negative correlation between the WSCT recollection of 
autonomous words and the WSCT automaticity estimate for autonomous words (r = -.64, 
p < .001); thus, as explicit memory of autonomous words increased, implicit memory of 
autonomous words decreased.  If these results were corrected with a Bonferroni 
adjustment (calculated by dividing the probability .05 by the number of correlations 80) 
to the probabilities, there would be fewer significant correlations.  The following 
correlations were significant after the Bonferroni adjustment:  (1) The BDI-II was 
significantly correlated with the PSI Autonomy and Sociotropy scales; (2) The PSI scales 
were correlated with each other; and (3) The implicit and explicit measures of autonomy 
on the WSCT were correlated. 
 
                
Table 7 Correlations among Implicit and Explicit Measures 
(n=30)                                        
                                                      1.        2.        3.        4.        5.          6.        7.        8.         9.        10.        11.        12.        13.        14.            
1. BDI-IIa      --  **.8   **.61   -.23    -.14   *-.41    -.02     0        .05    -.08      .25      .21     -.02      -.03 
                             
2. PSI-Aa                               --       --    *.79  -.13    -.23 **-.48    -.23      .03     .02    -.1        .24      .18     -.1        -.17 
 
3. PSI-Sa                                 --       --        --    -.01    -.03     -.24     .08       .23     .16    -.07      .26      .25     -.2        -.06 
 
4. IAT-negativeb                    --       --        --       --   **.48      .2        .1     -.25    -.09   -.04     -.08      .05      .19       .17     
  
5. IAT-autonomyb                  --       --        --       --        --       .16   -.11     -.02    -.33   -.29     -.09     .05      .27       .04        
 
6. IAT-sociotropyb                 --       --        --       --        --        --       .18     -.04    .05     .01     -.05     .13      .05       .11 
 
7. WSCT-recollection-Pa        --       --        --       --        --        --        --        .28 **.53 **.59     -.09     -.08     -.3         .26 
      
8. WSCT-recollection-Na       --       --        --       --        --        --        --         --      .16     .25     -.08     -.15   .05      .02    
      
9. WSCT-recollection-Aa       --       --        --       --        --        --        --         --       --   **.51     -.1       .07 **-.64      -.11  
 
10. WSCT-recollection-Sa      --       --        --       --        --        --        --         --       --       --       -.26      -.32     -.02       .13 
 
11. WSCT-automaticity-PPb     --       --        --       --        --        --        --         --       --       --         --  **.5       -.03       .24  
        
12. WSCT-automaticity-Nb --       --        --       --        --        --        --         --       --       --         --        --        -.18     -.04 
        
13. WSCT-automaticity-Ab --       --       --       --        --        --        --         --       --       --         --         --           --       .22 
 
14. WSCT-automaticity-Sb    --       --      --       --        --        --        --         --       --       --         --         --           --        --   
Note.  A=autonomy; S=sociotropy; P=positive; N=negative.   
 
aExplicit measure.  bImplicit measure. 
 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
4.  Discussion 
 
Study Overview
  This study was designed to measure implicit cognitive processes in depressed 
individuals.  There are theories that postulate the existence of underlying negative 
cognitive processes in depression; however, there are not many studies to support implicit 
self-concept and implicit memory in depression.  This study examined automatic self-
concept and implicit memory in depressed individuals.  Participants’ response times were 
recorded during a task (IAT) where they implicitly associated themselves with negative 
and positive words.  The second implicit task (WSCT) involved completing a word stem 
not using a word they viewed during the first implicit task.   
Covariates 
 After MANOVA’s were run, anxiety measures were entered as covariates in order 
to control for anxiety while looking at differences in implicit measures based on 
depression.  However, it was likely that depression was removed from the analyses since 
the BDI-II was significantly positively correlated with the STAI-State (r = .79, p < .001) 
and STAI-Trait (r = .91, p < .001), and many of the items on these measures are similar.  
There were significant differences on anxiety measures between depressed and never 
depressed groups, F(2,27) = 80.90, p = .001.  It is difficult to separate anxiety from 
depression, as they are often comorbid, especially in a severely and persistently mentally 
ill population like the depressed group recruited in this study.  The results of the 
MANCOVA’s are only reported in the discussion section and are not considered primary 
analyses.      
 
 
                
Depressed Versus Never Depressed Groups 
IAT   
 A mixed-model MANOVA showed significant results within groups on the IAT, 
in that participants demonstrated a significant positive bias, making faster associations 
between self and positive descriptive stimuli than negative descriptive stimuli, indicating 
a stronger positive self-concept bias than a negative self-concept bias according to neural 
network theory.  This finding was somewhat congruent with Gemar and colleagues’ 
(2001) study, in that their formerly and currently clinically depressed patients groups also 
showed a positive bias, albeit a smaller positive bias than the control group.  There were 
no significant differences within groups after the anxiety covariates were entered F(1,26) 
= 1.23, p = .28, eta squared = .05.  There were no significant differences in implicit self-
concept between depressed and never depressed groups when comparing association of 
self with negative and positive descriptive stimuli.  The mean differences between the 
depressed and never depressed groups were in the expected direction; however, the 
variance within groups on each dependent variable was high (see Table 2).  There were 
no significant differences between groups after the anxiety covariates were entered, 
F(1,26) = 1.26, p = .27, eta squared = .05.  It may be that depressed people do not have as 
strong a positive self-concept as never depressed people, but perhaps they have a 
tendency to defend against a negative self-concept.   
WSCT   
 Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences in implicit memory 
within and between depressed and never depressed groups.  There were also no 
significant differences in implicit memory after the anxiety covariates were entered 
 
                
within groups, F(1,26) = .22, p = .65, eta squared = .008 and between groups, F(1,26) = 
.22, p = .65, eta squared = .05.   
Autonomy and Sociotropy Groups 
IAT  
 There were no significant differences in implicit self-concept within depressive 
personality groups on the IAT.  In addition, there were no significant differences within 
groups after the covariates were entered, F(2,46) = .81, p = .45, eta squared = .05.  There 
was a strong tendency for differences in implicit self-concept biases between groups 
based on depressive personality style.  After the covariates were entered, significant 
differences were found between groups, F(1,23) = 8.25, p = .009, eta squared = .26.  
Those who were high on autonomy tended to have a smaller positive self-concept bias 
(but not a negative autonomy bias) than those depressed and low on autonomy and those 
never depressed.  Depressed individuals who scored high on the personality trait 
autonomy on the PSI had a greater tendency to associate themselves with negative 
descriptive words that were associated with lack of independence and failure in goal 
achievement than individuals depressed and low on autonomy and those never depressed.  
These individuals may see themselves in a negative light, especially in attempts to 
maintain independence and succeed in accomplishing tasks.  These results suggest a 
negative self-concept in depressed high autonomy individuals that was assessed without 
interference from social desirability, self-deception, subjectivity, and experimental 
demand that may occur when participants are aware of what is being assessed and 
respond either intentionally or unintentionally in a particular direction.  These individuals 
may be prone to have the core belief revolving around “I am a failure” and may benefit 
 
                
from cognitive therapy to change dysfunctional negative beliefs to more adaptive ones.  It 
may be useful to use an implicit measure to assess changes in self-concept to circumvent 
the pitfalls of explicit self-report measures.   
WSCT   
 There were significant differences in implicit memory within depressive 
personality groups.  These within-group differences were not significant after the anxiety 
covariates were entered, F(2,46) = 2.36, p = .11, eta squared = .09.  The means within 
groups were not in an expected direction. All groups demonstrated highest implicit 
memory of negative sociotropic words.  Also, all groups except those in the depressed 
and low on autonomy group exhibited the second greatest implicit memory for negative 
autonomous words.  The reasons for this are unclear.  This may have resulted from 
participants failing to complete many of the baseline word stems (word stems that could 
not be completed by words previously viewed) with new word stimuli (stimuli that the 
participants did not see in the IAT) pertaining to autonomy and sociotropy; thus, the 
probability of completing a baseline word stem with new word stimuli was small.  
Baseline was subtracted from the automaticity estimate to calculate automatic processes 
in the experiment.  Although word stimuli were matched for frequency of use, it may 
have been easier for participants to think of general positive and negative words than 
words pertaining to autonomy and sociotropy.  The differences in implicit memory 
between positive and general depressive words seemed minimal within all groups.  There 
were no significant differences in implicit memory between groups based on level of 
autonomy and sociotropy.  In addition, there were no significant differences between 
 
                
groups after the anxiety covariates were entered based on autonomy, F(1,23) = .38, p = 
.55, eta squared = .02 and sociotropy, F(1,23) = 1.3, p = .27, eta squared = .05.   
Correlation Analyses 
 There were several significant correlations between explicit measures and implicit 
measures within and between types of measures; however, given the number of 
correlations that were calculated (80), these p-values are “pseudo probabilities” because 
the results do not take into account the number of correlations tested.  If these results 
were corrected with a Bonferroni adjustment (calculated by dividing the probability .05 
by the number of correlations 80) to the probabilities, there would be fewer significant 
correlations.  The following correlations were significant after the Bonferroni adjustment:  
(1) The BDI-II was significantly correlated with the PSI Autonomy and Sociotropy 
scales; (2) The PSI scales were correlated with each other; and (3) The implicit and 
explicit measures of autonomy on the WSCT were correlated.  The other “significant” 
correlations in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution, as the Bonferroni corrections 
were not reported in the table. These correlations would have to be replicated before any 
conclusions could be drawn. 
Summary of Results and Implications 
 This study contributes to the understanding of how implicit cognitive processes in 
depression compare and contrast with explicit cognitive processes.  It is notable that all 
participants exhibited a self-concept positive bias, and there was not a significant 
difference in self-concept bias between depressed and never depressed participants.  The 
depressed participants were receiving treatment at Valley Mental Health at the time of 
recruitment.  It may be that receiving treatment for depression has ameliorated these 
 
                
participants’ negative self-concepts.  Future studies may investigate differences in 
implicit self-concept among depressed individuals who are on a wait-list for treatment 
and depressed individuals who have been receiving treatment for a specified amount of 
time.  On the other hand, it may be that depressed individuals are in a constant volitional 
state of convincing themselves and others how “bad” they are while implicitly they have 
more positive beliefs about themselves.  Perhaps instead of focusing on changing 
underlying negative beliefs about self, depressed individuals may benefit from focusing 
on strengthening the underlying positive beliefs about self that already exist.  This could 
be facilitated by identification of underlying positive beliefs about self and focusing on 
individual strengths and accomplishments that may be explicitly denied or ignored.  
Perhaps depressed individuals need to calibrate their filters to ignore or allow minimal 
attention to explicit negative stimuli and attend to positive thoughts, behaviors, and 
feedback from others rather than focus on challenging negative beliefs.  Future studies 
may explore this hypothesis, although it is not congruent with most theories of 
depression.   
 There was some degree of support in this study for greater implicit cognitive 
processing of self-relevant stimuli in depressed individuals (based on autonomy) even 
though the finding just approached significance.  It is interesting that nearly significant 
differences were found among the autonomy groups but not among the sociotropy 
groups.  The reason for this is unclear.  The nature of the task may have contributed to 
these differences.  The two tasks were goal-oriented and were completed alone (the 
researcher sat in the room but did not interact with the participant).  This goal-oriented 
non-interpersonal experiment may have triggered implicit autonomy beliefs in those high 
 
                
on autonomy.  According Blatt and Shichman (1983), depressed individuals who are 
highly introjective (autonomous) will use unconscious strategies to maintain a sense of 
the self as separate, autonomous, and positively valued.  It may be that the participant’s 
sense of introjection was challenged during these tasks.  These results lend support for 
use of: 1) implicit assessment to facilitate case conceptualization; 2) identification of 
clinical targets based on implicit self-concept; and 3) monitoring progress of changing 
dysfunctional cognitive beliefs into more adaptive ones, without experiencing the 
“pitfalls” of explicit measures.  
 Depressed individuals were grouped based on one personality measure of 
sociotropy/autonomy.  Some participants were high on both sociotropy and autonomy; 
therefore, it would be unlikely to find within-group differences in these participants based 
on this personality measure, since these two constructs were not independent of each 
other.  An idiographic assessment involving a full battery of psychological testing would 
be a more precise and powerful method of separating depressed individuals into groups 
rather than defining them based on a single explicit measure of personality.  Based on 
assessment results, the investigator would then be able to generate self-relevant stimuli.  
In addition to self-relevant stimuli, investigators may study implicit processes in 
depression that include beliefs about others and future.   
 The analyses that were not significant in this study tended to have small effect 
sizes.  One way to increase power would be to increase sample size.  According to Cohen 
(1988), a sample size of 88 would be required for the MANOVA with two groups and a 
sample of 130 would be required for the 3 x 3 MANOVA based on a small effect size of 
.1.   
 
                
Study Challenges
 The investigator encountered several challenges during the study that may have 
weakened construct validity.  The investigator intended to select only those words that 
judges rated 4 or greater on a scale of 1 to 6 for each category of words; however, the 
investigator was not able to find enough word stimuli that would meet these requirements 
in addition to the selection criteria word length and frequency and original word stem. 
The greatest challenge was finding autonomy- and sociotropy-related word stimuli.  This 
investigator recruited 10 judges who were mental health clinicians to rate each word 
stimulus on a Likert scale 1 – 6, with 1 being the word stimulus fits into the category (e.g. 
sociotropic) “not at all” and 6 “very well”.  The average rating for each word stimulus 
was used as a selection criterion.  Future studies investigating implicit cognitive 
processes may benefit from employing at least 50 – 100 judges to rate word stimuli and 
select only those stimuli that meet a minimum rating by all judges.  It was proposed that 
never depressed participants were to be recruited from a general medical clinic.  The 
investigator attempted to recruit participants at a general family medicine clinic; 
however, no patients agreed to participate, and after two months with no response, the 
investigator recruited never depressed employees from various Valley Mental Health 
sites to participate in the study.  Therefore, one unintentional difference between the 
depressed and never depressed groups was that the depressed participants were seeking 
health treatment, while the never depressed participants may not have been seeking 
health treatment at the time of the study.  
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